At the beginning of President Lincoln's term as Commander and Chief, the military forces were already in trouble. From 1849 to 1860, the Secretaries of War had all been from Southern States, and had little interest in strengthening the Federal forces that could conceivably be used against their home States. (1) The pre-war army was small and widely dispersed across the nation. On January 1, 1861, the Regular Army was composed of 1,108 officers and 15,259 enlisted men, organized into nineteen regiments. This small Army was spread across the United States in six departments, with headquarters located in the following areas: Troy, N.Y., St. Louis, Missouri, San Antonio, Texas, Santa Fe, New Mexico, Camp Floyd, Utah. and San Francisco, California. To cover this large area, units were broken down into company or smaller organizations to garrison isolated outposts in their regions. Before the Civil War, it was rare for an element of the Regular Army to gather in any strength greater than battalion level, and soldiers were usually left in increments less than company size.
This small force was decimated when Texas seceded from the Union. General Twiggs surrendered his Department of Texas and its 2,328 enlisted men on February 18, 1861. At the time of surrender these forces were allowed withdraw from the State. Only 1,200 had left by the start of the war, and the remainder became prisoners. (2)
A total of 313 officers had left the U.S. Army and joined the Confederacy by Lincoln's inauguration on March 4, 1861. When The Civil War began on April 12, 1861 the size of the Regular Army (according to the figures above) was 785 officers and 14,131 enlisted men. The Federal government lacked any immediate plan to mobilize for war. The only law in existence at that time permitting the raising of additional troops for the Federal Government was the Militia Act of 1792, which empowered the President to call out the Militia to suppress insurrection. Using this law, Lincoln called for 75,000 militiamen to serve for three months for the implementation of General Winfield Scott's Anaconda Plan. General Scott, the 74-year-old general-in-chief of the Union Army, was an able officer, who received his commission in 1808 and commanded in the War of 1812 and the Mexican War, was the only man in Washington with a sound plan for the execution of the war. Scott's Anaconda Plan, calling for control of the Mississippi River to conduct an enveloping land campaign in conjunction with a tight naval blockade, was sound overall, but grossly underestimated the number of necessary soldiers, estimating a need of a 25,000 soldier Regular Army and a three year Volunteer Army of 60,000 men. Unfortunately, Lincoln and his advisers refused to accept General Scott's plan as long as a compromise with the South remained possible, combining with Lincoln's insecurity towards asking Congress for more men to create a lethargic Federal Government at a time when the people were most willing to respond. (3)
Due to the relatively weak nature of the Federal Government at the outbreak of war, the State Governments had considerable decision-making power over the organization of the Union Army. In the South, once secession was established policy in the South, the need for State's Rights evaporated, because the interests of those States was homogeneous. In the Northern States, however, people in the North were not bound by a common cause - some fought to preserve the Union, some for economic reasons, and others for the abolition of slavery. Regardless of their differences, the response of the State Governments to call for men was outstanding. New York was second only to Wisconsin in acting to raise the Army. (4)
1. Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army 1775-1945 (Washington, 1955), 84.
2. Ibid., 88-89.
3. Ibid., 90-92.
4. Fred Albert Shannon, The Organization and Administration of The Union Army1861-1865 (Gloucester, 1965) 15-21.