Governor Edwin Denison Morgan and the Recruitment of the Union Army in New York State

Confusion in the War Department

Morgan sent State Judge Advocate General William H. Anthon to Washington to clarify matters, and by May 22, the problems seemed solved with the War Department's acceptance of the 38 regiments, exclusive of the three month State Militia. Two days later, after a federal officer had mistakenly mustered in some of the two-year men as three-month men, it became apparent that Cameron still lacked any understanding of the situation. In early June, Morgan and Anthon again returned to Washington to sort out the matter. By June 12, Morgan had secured from Cameron an understanding that under the first quota, New York would furnish 38 regiments of two-year volunteers, exclusive of the ten regiments of three-month State Militia men. By the time the agreement had been reached, fifteen regiments of two-year men had already been enrolled. Morgan promised that he would send the rest within one month and by July 12, New York had sent 38 regiments of two-year volunteers and ten regiments of State Militia to Washington. ⁽²⁾

Throughout this debacle, one independent recruiting organization perceived a lack of enthusiasm for the war at both the State and Federal levels. The Union Defense Committee (UDC) consisted of prominent figures from New York City; all its members had past political or business dealings with Morgan. Although the intentions of the Committee were honorable, it caused considerable confusion. Hamilton Fish, the Committee chairman, led a Committee delegation that went to Washington on May 15 and offered the President 14 regiments of two-year volunteers. Lincoln initially told the Committee to operate through the proper channels, but changed his mind three days later and accepted the regiments. This outraged Morgan, who complained to the President on May 19 that both he and the UDC had challenged Morgan's authority. Lincoln replied the next day, and though he admitted some responsibility for the action, he had based his decision in part on the UDC's belief that it was unsafe to keep the men in New York City any longer. He had consulted with General Scott on the matter, and he also recommended bringing the men forward. Much of the misunderstanding stemmed from misrepresentations by the UDC. Some of the regiments sent forward by the UDC were actually volunteer regiments organized by the State, although others were totally independent. Lincoln, with larger issues to deal with, did not have the time to study the problem. He needed soldiers; he was offered soldiers. The President went on to commend Morgan for his quick response in raising troops, and assured him that no breach of authority was intended. ⁽³⁾

Morgan also lashed out at the UDC. In a letter to the chairman on May 19, he accused the committee both of insubordination and of "striking at the very foundation of discipline." Morgan had withheld the regiments due to their lack of readiness and equipment. Hamilton Fish sent a letter of apology on May 21, denying any attempt on the part of the UDC to undermine the Governor. ⁽⁴⁾ The situation was resolved when Morgan and Colonel W.B. Franklin of the War Department met with the members of the UDC on May 26. After the meeting, the UDC's regiments were placed under Morgan's authority. The UDC became an ideal illustration of why enrollment needed to be centrally managed by the government and not left to independent organizations. At the meeting, the UDC admitted that they only had six regiments to send to Washington. Morgan added the other eight regiments to the regiments he already had to fill. The UDC lost further credibility when 350 of the men it recruited refused to muster in when they reached Washington. From that point forward, the committee receded into the background. ⁽⁵⁾

Lincoln finally addressed the problems relating to slowness of the Federal Government in accepting volunteer troops, in a July speech to Congress: "One of the greatest perplexities of the Government is to avoid receiving troops faster than it can provide for them." That message was made in response to a May meeting of the Governors of the Northern States. The governors criticized Lincoln's administration for not taking more men. ⁽⁶⁾ By August, the governors were looking for the Federal Government to eliminate independent regiments. The Federal Government responded by banning independent recruitment throughout the States. ⁽⁷⁾

The problem became critical after the President's July 25 call for troops. Of the 500,000 three-year volunteers requested, New York was responsible for 25,000. Competition for enlistments became fierce, due in part to the authorizations made by the Federal Government for 75 independent regiments between July 22 and August 30. The other factor influencing the drop in enlistments was the defeat at Bull Run, which gave the patriotic zeal of the North a strong dose of reality. ⁽⁸⁾

In New York State, Morgan acted to end independent recruitment before the Federal Government. On September 5, notice of New York State General Order 71 was transmitted through the Quartermaster Generals office. No volunteer unit would be equipped by the State anymore, unless specifically authorized by the Governor. ⁽⁹⁾ Through this action, Morgan avoided violating the rights of New Yorkers to join the Federal Army through different manners. They remained free to do so, but from that point forward, the State would take no responsibility for them.

Another struggle developed between the State and Federal Governments through the selection and commissioning of officers. Under the first call of April 16, Lincoln had authorized the appointment of two Major Generals; Morgan appointed John A. Dix and James Wadsworth. On May 4, War Department General Order Number 15 reserved the appointment of Generals to the President. Morgan held his ground, and was vindicated in September when both Dix and Wadsworth officially received their commissions. Governor Morgan himself was appointed Major General of Volunteers when the Department of New York was created, and was placed in command. Morgan refused any salary for the position, however, it did strengthen his authority over troops from the State. ⁽¹⁰⁾ Morgan, beginning with the July 25 call for troops, already applied a lesser part of General Order 15, by requiring a written examination for all commissioned officers.

Under Morgan's interpretation of the Order, elections remained for Company grade officers, while field grade officers were to be appointed by the Governor. The elective process for Company grade officers was offset by specific recruitment totals set down by Morgan. A Second Lieutenant was commissioned after the recruitment of 30 men, a First Lieutenant after 40 men, and a Captain only upon completion of a Company-sized element. Promotions in the field were based on merit, and occurred only through the ranks of that particular unit. Field grade appointments were generally a matter of patronage, although Morgan did seek out as many West Point men as possible. ⁽¹¹⁾

1. Eugene Arus Nash, A History of the Forty-Forth Regiment New York Volunteer Infantry in the Civil War, 1861-1865 (Chicago, 1911), 5.

2. Rawley, Edwin D. Morgan, 143-46.

3. Ibid., 146-48.

4. Edwin D. Morgan Papers, New York State Library, Collection Call # GK11818, box 84, folder 7. 5. Rawley, Edwin D. Morgan, pp. 148-49.

6. Ibid., 143. Morgan did not attend that May meeting.

7. Ibid., 150-51.

8. Ibid., 163-65.

9. Edwin D. Morgan Papers, New York State Library, Collection Call # GK11818, box 41 folder 1.

10. Rawley, Edwin D. Morgan, 151-52.

11. Ibid., 162-63.

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